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This dissertation empirically explores raising rivals’ costs (RRC) and its impact on competition
and consumer welfare in markets for remanufactured goods, defined as goods that are restored to
market condition after they have been used. When an original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
faces competition by remanufacturers, it has incentives to implement product characteristics that
increase the cost of remanufacture. This behavior is efficiency-reducing in the sense that it increases
production costs (possibly for both the OEM and the remanufacturers), and in the sense that it reduces
competition.
In Chapter 1, I discuss the relevant literature and the empirical setting. Using data on printer and
ink cartridge sales, I present evidence that printer/ink OEMs effectively use this type of strategy to
mitigate competition from ink cartridge remanufacturers.
In Chapter 2, I develop a structural model of consumer demand for printers which accounts for
remanufactured ink, and for competition among the OEMs and between the OEMs and remanufac-
turers. Using this model, I estimate that the OEMs’ strongest RRC strategies raise remanufacturers’
marginal costs by 40%. I estimate the welfare effects associated with remanufacturer entry, and last,
I find modest welfare gains in regulatory counterfactuals that constrain OEM product design.
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CHAPTER 1: INDUSTRY DETAILS AND DATA
1.1 Introduction
Raising rivals’ costs (RRC) is an anti-trust concern first formalized by Salop and Scheffman (1983).
As a framework for regulatory analysis, it is useful because it is very straightforward: a firm engages
in RRC by making production more costly for its competitor(s), reducing their optimal output, and
so increasing the residual demand for its own product. Even if the cost-raising strategy is itself costly,
it can still improve profit if the effect on residual demand is big enough.1
An underexplored channel for RRC is the manipulation of the (non-price) characteristics of
inputs. In the paper, I use data on printer and ink sales to empirically study the effect such cost-
raising characteristics have on consumer welfare and the competition between the original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) and third-parties. In these settings, the OEM makes design decisions that
can directly impact third-party remanufactures, repairers, and refurbishers of that firm’s goods - for
example through the costs of part replacement, disassembly, waste disposal, or by making those
processes require specialized tools or access to information.
Remanufacture is the process of restoring end-of-life products to original specifications - from
Hammond, Amezquita, and Bras (1996), the contrast between remanufacture and “material recycling,
[is that] the geometrical form of the product is retained” in remanufacture. The remanufacturing
sector in the U.S. grew from $37.3 billion in 2009 to at least2 $43.0 billion in 2011, and spans
several industries, the largest of which include aerospace and auto parts, medical devices, and IT
hardware (USITC 2013). The process of remanufacture is usually more cost- and energy-efficient
1Not all strategies which raise rivals’ costs are necessarily anti-competitive - for example, in the presence of
fixed costs for production, any strategy which attracts a rival’s consumers can raise their average costs. In
practice, RRC regulation has focused not only on strategies which directly impact a rival’s cost function, but
also on outcomes in the associated markets, like the effects on price level and consumer welfare attributable
to the strategies in question.
2From USITC (2013): “Because of differences in terminology across industry sectors, ambiguity in the
definition of remanufactured goods, and the nonsystematic survey of importers and firms with fewer than
20 employees, this report’s estimates of remanufactured goods production, trade, and employment may be
somewhat low.”
than original production,3 and it preserves most of the physical materials used in the original product.
However, because the end-of-life product is the key input, the OEM has considerable power to
mitigate potential competition by third-party remanufacturers.
It is well established that OEM decisions about product characteristics affect the cost of remanu-
facturing. Hammond, Amezquita, and Bras (1996) survey 30 third-party auto parts remanufacturers,
and find significant costs associated with product design, including some design characteristics
that are unlikely to positively affect consumer value.4 Disassembly of smartphone produced by
OEMs like Apple often requires specialized tools that can only be reliably accessed directly through
the OEM, usually requiring special licensing,5 resulting in increased costs for third-party phone
refurbisher - a notoriously salient example includes Apple’s pentalobe screws.6
In addition to the implementation of cost-raising product characteristics, this dissertation also
explores another practice which raises costs for remanufacturers, and broadly for producers of goods
which complement OEM products. OEMs may change their product’s design, or discontinue and
introduce a new version of their product. When they do so, the remanufacturer must adjust their
production process to accommodate the new design, a process which may be costly.
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I discuss these two practices in the printer and ink cartridges
industry, and insights that translate broadly to remanufacture and other settings. I first discuss the
theoretical and empirical literature on RRC. Then I discuss industry details and I use Nielsen RMS
retail sales data to provide evidence for the prevalence and efficacy of these practices.
3The US International Trade Commission (2013) reports that remanufactured auto engines typically cost 50%
as much as new engines, and use around 10% as much energy in the remanufacturing process.
4These include the use of permanent fastenings, rather than screw or bolt fastenings, design complexity, and
means of assembly and disassembly - particularly whether a part can be disassembled without damaging an
important component.
5Apple has been historically restrictive in its third-party licensing deals for tools and manuals, although as
recently as 2019, has begun to slowly expand its license dealings. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-apple-
repair/apple-expands-independent-repair-shop-program-to-mac-computers-idUKKCN25D1EV
6These five-pointed screws were introduced in early 2011, located at the bottom of the iPhone 4. Later that
year, third-party begain offering a compatible screwdriver typically priced around $2 - however, this wide
availability of a specific tool is the exception, not the rule, and is likely due to the salience of the screws, as
well as the fact that almost any repair (even very simple home-repair by consumers) would require unscrewing
the pentalobes as a first step. Apple has since introduced many other screw models, including a variety of
size variations on the pentalobe.
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1.2 Related Literature
The early RRC literature (Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987)) mostly deals with raising rivals’
marginal costs, and is concerned with the question of when it is profitable to do so. The core tradeoff
is the cost of implementing the cost-raising strategy, versus the benefit of the additional residual
demand due to lower production from rivals.
An important channel in the early literature is the overpurchase of inputs (relative to the cost-
minimizing quantity for a given level the of output) to raise prices in those markets. and show that
vertical mergers can be anticompetitive by allowing more aggressive overpurchase of shared inputs,
since the cost-raising firm is insulated from a share of those increased costs by its upstream unit.
Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990, 1992), and Hart and Tirole (1990) use a multi-stage model to
discuss the specific use of vertical mergers and exclusive-dealing contracts to prevent market entry or
foreclose on inputs used by active rivals, forcing them to use an outside option instead.7 In general,
they show that it is possible to use these measures to raise rivals’ costs to anti-competitive ends in
equilibrium, but that outcomes can vary widely, and such measures can lead to higher or lower prices,
welfare, and profits in final goods markets.8 Hviid and Olczak (2016) consider a two-stage game,
where a dominant firm makes a costly investment to raise a rival’s fixed costs, and that rival then
decides whether to enter and compete in the following period. They find conditions for prevention
of entry in equilibrium - however, the observation that such fixed-cost raising strategies may be
profitable long predates the RRC literature, for example in Bain (1957), and has been made informally
in the RRC context as well (Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1988).
The theoretical literature also discusses strategies for implementing RRC. In addition to vertical
mergers and contracting, Salop and Scheffman (1987), Scheffman and Higgins (2003), and the
appendix of Hviid and Olczak discuss government and regulatory capture, which may be used to
impose costly regulations (even for the cost-raising firm); commencing advertising and R&D wars;
7Exclusive-dealing describes an agreement between an upstream and downstream firm, where the upstream
firm agrees not to sell inputs to one or more downstream competitor, or vice versa – these contracts often raise
anti-trust concerns, but may improve efficiency on net by helping firms organize their production process.
8Ordover, Saloner, and Salop’s work is also more broadly a response to the “Chicago critique” of foreclosure
theory, collected and formalized in Posner (1976), and Bork (1978), which argued that market foreclosure
could not be a rational explanation for vertical mergers or exclusive-dealing contracts, because any profits
gained in the absence of a foreclosed rival could also be gained in their presence, simply by collecting profits
on the inputs in question.
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overpurchase of inputs to raise market prices; and patent-thicket or frivolous litigation strategies.
This paper expands this set of channels in its consideration of manipulation of input characteristics.
The empirical RRC literature has particularly focused vertical mergers and contracts. Hastings
and Gilbert (2005) find evidence that gasoline markets with higher levels of vertical integration
tended to result in higher wholesale prices for non-vertically integrated firms. Hortaçsu and Syverson
(2007) find evidence that in the market for ready-mix cement, efficiency gains from vertical mergers
dominated potential negative RRC effects. In that paper, firms that are more vertically integrated
tend to have more efficient upstream units (both as a result of integration, and also as a driver of
the integration in the first place). As a result, integrated firms charge lower prices overall, even to
non-integrated downstream firms. Chipty (2001) finds a similar result: while integrated cable TV
programming and distribution providers tend to exclude programming from rivals in their offerings
to consumers (potentially raising the cost to those rivals of delivering their programming), the net
effect on consumer welfare may be positive, due to lower prices.
Similarly, Asker (2016) considers exclusive-dealing contract terms in the American beer market.
Asker finds evidence from the Chicago market in 1994 that the efficiency gains dominated potential
cost-raising effects in that setting. In an example of illicit vertical contracting however, Granitz and
Klien (1996) find evidence that the Standard Oil monopolization of petroleum refinery in the late
1800s relied strongly on RRC through manipulation of the rail transport industry (transport being an
important upstream input for oil refinery). Standard Oil used its downstream market share in refining
to enforce cartel pricing in the rail transportation market, and in some cases, to enforce exclusion of
potential refining entrants. This paper further expands the empirical literature beyond RRC through
vertical contracts and mergers.
In a related study, Watkins (2019) develops a model for competition between paper producers
and recyclers. The initial paper manufacturers know that some share of their product will be recycled,
and subsequently used to produce a competing product. As a result, these initial manufacturers
have incentives to constrain their own production; doing so reduces recylcers’ access to a key input.
Watkins finds empirical evidence that these manufacturers choose to reduce their production in
response to policy changes which increased competition from recyclers. In this sense, the initial
manufacturers modify product output to raise their rivals’ costs.
4
Additionally, in the specific example of printers and ink, there is a useful contribution to the
bundling literature on horizontal foreclosure as described at length in Rey and Tirole (2007). In
the anti-trust literature, the essence of the horizontal foreclosure concern is that firms which sell a
monopoly product and a non-monopoly product may bundle the two products together to transfer
their monopoly power to an otherwise competitive market. The “Chicago critique” of Posner (1976)
and Bork (1978) argued that bundling cannot extend monopoly power, because consumer willingness
to pay for a bundle of goods will not generally exceed their willingness to pay for the pair of goods if
bought separately.
However, in a seminal paper, Whinston (1990) rigorously showed that this was possible in
equilibrium in the presence of entry costs. The idea is that if a monopolist can commit to bundling a
monopoly good with a competitive one, then the monopolist implicitly commits to low prices for the
competitive good, because the only way to recover profits for the monopoly good is by a low price
for the bundle. This commitment can dissuade potential entrants in the competitive market from
incurring the fixed entry cost.
Choi and Stefanides (2001) extend this idea to R&D. If a successful R&D investment step is
required to enter a market, then tying goods together makes it necessary for a potential entrant to
successfully complete this step twice, instead of once. Carlton and Waldman (2002) show that in the
presence of network externalities, a firm can establish or preserve monopoly power by using bundling
to build a large consumer base in the network good, even under threat by a more efficient competitor.
The printer and ink case presents an example of an unexplored mechanism for horizontal
foreclosure: the monopolist alters the monopoly good to reduce its compatibility with other firms’
versions of the competitive good. There are examples in the end of the data where HP’s new printer
models use the same ink cartridges as old printers, but different ink cartridge validation, essentially
making the third-party’s existing (competitive) product incompatible with the monopoly good.
This can be optimal when the benefits to the monopolist of selling the competitive good outweigh
the incentives to improve the compatibility between the two goods. In printers and ink, the main
benefit to the monopolist for selling ink is the ability to use ink sales as a price-discrimination strategy
which “meters” consumer value, as classically described in Bowman (1957) and Burnstien (1960).
Selling only printers and allowing third-parties to enter the ink market may still net profits, but would
forego this price-discrimination opportunity. The incentives to instead improve compatibility (and in
5
this example, allow more third-party activity in ink markets) are explored by Matutes and Regibeau
(1988, 1992) and Economides (1989); in general, firms benefit from making their goods compatible
with those of their rivals: this increases the variety of product combinations in the market and attracts
more consumers, and it can dampen firm competition (between an OEM and its ink remanufacturer)
on prices, since the benefits of a price cut are split between the firms.
The issue of choice of compatibility is distinct from the marginal cost of remanufacturing - it
is an issue of a fixed cost to begin operations in the first place. Examples of the importance of
this compatibility-based foreclosure extend to other examples of compatible goods, particularly
in pharmaceuticals: the FTC moved to stop a merger between Digene and Cytec because they
determined it would lead Cytec to refuse to allow other firms to develop HPV tests which were
complemented by its products.
1.3 Industry Details and Data
In this section, I describe the relevant industry details for consumer printers and ink, and describe
the data sources from which the sample is constructed, then present some descriptive analysis that
informs the design of the structural model in chapter 2.
1.3.1 Industry - Consumer Printers and Ink
The market for consumer printers is dominated by a few OEMs, with HP producing 40− 50% of
printers from 2006 to 2016, and Lexmark, Canon, Epson, Brother, and Kodak combining for all but
about 5% of the rest of printer sales. Most printers use ink or toner sold in cartridges (this is the case
for both inkjet and laser technology). Typically, a printer is stocked with a cartridge when purchased,
and consumers buy several replacements (on average 3-4 cartridges) over the life of the printer.9
These ink cartridges are compatible only with a small number of closely related printer models
(typically 2-5), all produced by the same firm: HP ink is never compatible with Canon printers or
vice versa. In this sense, each printer manufacturer can be thought of as having a monopoly in ink
among the consumers that own its printers.
9Credit Suisse IT Hardware, 16 March 2011, p 333
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It is well-documented that printer and ink OEMs use a “razor-and-blades” business model,
pricing the printer at or below marginal cost, and charging a steep markup for the ink cartridges.
IHS Markit, a market research firm that performs teardowns to estimate the cost of manufacturing
for consumer goods, estimates that the $70 HP Envy 4520 all-in-one printer costs about $120 to
manufacture.10
There are a few reasons to use this model: it may be a form of financing the printer, which could
be socially efficient if consumers have a higher discount rate than the firms. The classic bundling
explanation discussed in Bowman (1957) and Burnstien (1960) is that if there is wide dispersion in
ink use among consumers, the “razor-and-blades” model can let firms price discriminate through
metering11 because the consumers with the highest value for the durable also have the highest
intensity of use for the consumables. This strategy lets the firm charge high-value consumers an
especially high lifetime price.
It is not likely that consumer myopia is an important driver of the profitability of the strategy, at
least in the printers and ink market. It has long been conventional wisdom that firms like HP and
Xerox are “really selling the ink” that goes with their printers. Further, once a consumer owns a
printer, while they might be unpleasantly surprised by ink prices, there is no mechanism that compels
them to make expenditures on ink beyond what they find individually rational, and if OEMs make a
loss on printers, they do not benefit from tricking a consumer into buying a printer they will not use.
This “razor-and-blades” model presents an opportunity for third-party firms to produce compat-
ible inks and sell them to consumers who already own printers. Those firms then free-ride on the
losses incurred by the printer manufacturers. The most common type of third-party ink product is
remanufactured ink. The production process is simple: remanufacturers collect empty ink cartridges
(sometimes from recycling centers, sometimes by purchasing them directly from consumers), then
clean them and refill the cartridges with ink or laser toner. Most remanufacturers produce many lines
of remanufactured ink, and some lines are produced by large firms, like Office Depot. These products
10There are some recent exceptions to this model - in 2015, Epson introduced its Eco-Tank line of printers,
which have no cartridges, and instead retail for $250 - $500. Consumers buy much cheaper ink in bottles
(from Epson or third-parties) and simply refill their printer tanks. This line has grown since then, but sales of
these models of printer do not appear in my dataset.
11Other examples of this strategy is IBM card-readers and punch cards, video game consoles and games,
Amazon’s Kindle and e-books, Keurig machines and K-pods, and of course, razors and razor blades.
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tend to have lower prices, but also tend to have higher rates of on-page failures like streaking, and
typically have lower ink yields than the original cartridges.
OEMs have been willing to take on considerable costs to keep remanufacturers out of the
market - in a recent Supreme Court case,12 Lexmark (unsuccessfully) tried to prevent Impressions
Products from selling remanufactured cartridges on the basis of patent law, claiming Impressions
was infringing on patented cartridge technology.
I focus specifically on the impact of the implementation smart-chips in ink cartridges which share
information with printers, and must be either replaced or reset in order to make a refilled cartridge
usable. These chips were first used by the Toshiba TEC Corporation in the early 1990s, and have
since become almost universally implemented among consumer printers in the US.13 The purpose of
the chips is to record certain information and relay it to the printer - most often about estimated ink
levels, and in some cases, expiration dates. When a cartridge chip reports that it is empty, it produces
an error message for the printer, which in turn prompts the device that sent the most recent printing
job to produce a message instructing the consumer to buy more (OEM) ink.14 Additionally, if the
printer does not recognize the ink chip at all, perhaps due to damage or malfunction, it will refuse to
print.
However, there is heterogeneity in the “strength” of these ink chips. HP and Lexmark chips
are notoriously strong, and are also typically integrated into the ink cartridges, and so can be
difficult to remove.15 These chips generally need to be replaced, and it can take time for potential
remanufacturers to figure out how to do this effectively. The chips use by Canon, Epson, and Brother
are generally weaker, and can in most cases be reset by small devices such as the one pictured in
Figure 1. I find that this heterogeneity in firm strategy corresponds with significantly higher estimated
marginal costs for remanufacturers, bigger differences in remanufactured ink quality, and delayed
remanufacturer entry into ink markets.
12Impression Products v. Lexmark International, 137 S.Ct. 1523 (2017)
13The European Union outlawed the ink chips in 2002 - OEMs have implemented other strategies since
then, particularly focused on region-locking printers and inks, so that cartridges sold in one country are not
compatible with printers sold in another
14These messages can often be overidden, though the process varies by printer and is often cumbersome for
consumers.
15BCH Technologies reports that all modern HP chips protect data with 128-bit security, making it functionally
impossible to reset page counts.
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Figure 1: Chip Strategies
Image source: inkjet411.com
1.3.2 Data Sources
The primary data source is the University of Chicago’s Nielsen Retail Management (RMS) scanner
data, collected from retail stores in the United States from January 2006 through December 2016.
The observations are at the UPC-store-week level. Each store is the physical location where the sales
are recorded. Each observation includes the sales quantity and average price.
The UPCs are 12-digit bar codes that are unique for each product.16 The Nielsen data includes a
small text description of each product for each UPC, but it is rarely enough to identify the product
model. Instead, I search two databases, Upcitemdb 17 and Amazon’s ASIN to match UPCs to the
actual products. I identify printers by a make-model-line triplet (e.g. HP Deskjet D4360), and ink
cartridges by a make-model pair (e.g. HP 74). Although many UPCs are not identifiable (roughly
half show up in neither UPC database source), they account for a very small share of sales - about
5% by revenue.
As a secondary data source, I scrape product characteristics from CNET, a large media site on
consumer electronics. The scraped characteristics include printer technology, functions, footprint,
weight, colors, print resolution, print speed, and the relevant ink cartridge models. For each ink, I
16Some UPCs are reassigned (by manufacturers) after some period of disuse, usually more than one year.
After the data trimming steps I describe, I am not left with any UPCs that have more than one year of disuse




collect color, reported page yield, technology and an indicator for whether the ink product comes
from the OEM or a remanufacturer. Each of these characteristics are defined and described in detail
in the Appendix, in Tables A1 and A2.
It is also useful to group each product into “families” by compatibility. I define an ink family as
the set of all ink models which are compatible with at least one shared printer. Figure 1 illustrates
an example: The HP Officejet 4215 is compatible only with the HP 56 cartridge, which is a black
ink. The HP Officejet 5510 is compatible with the HP 56 cartridge and the HP 57, a tri-color (cyan,
magenta, yellow) cartridge. There are also remanufactured ink options for both inks. All four inks
are in the same ink family, and both printers are in the same printer family. Unfortunately, I find that
there at the within-store level, purchases of inks are not very correlated with purchases of compatible
printers, suggesting that its very common to buy printers in one location and inks in another at a
later date. This is compounded by the fact that most printers have lifespans of many years, and many
printer purchases take place before the data begins. As a result, I aggregate the the data to the national
level and monthly level. After collecting all ink and printer models into the families described, and
trim out the printers which record fewer than 100 ink cartridge sales within the sample. This narrows
the data to 84 ink and printer families.
As a data validation step, I compare this national sample to some industry reports to check for
sampling biases in the data and my trimming process. Statista has collected industry survey data for
both printer sales and ink sales by revenue.18 Usefully, there is also a survey by Ibisworld which
found that remanufactured ink was roughly 15% of ink sales by revenue in 2012.19
The first sampling issue is that in the data, remanufactured ink accounts for only 5% of sales by
revenue. In estimation, this sampling error will make the model overestimate how strongly the OEM
firms react to different levels of competition by the remanufacturers, if uncorrected. To compensate,
I multiplicatively adjust remanufactured ink sales so that they represent 15% total ink sales over the
sample, matching the Ibisworld report.
After the trimming and sample correction steps above, the data sample contains about 1% of






Figure 2: Product Compatibility
Image sources: HP and Inkjets.com. All ink products belong in the same family because they are compatible
with at least one shared printer, and both printers belong in the same family because they are compatible with
at least one shared ink.
the data where ink sales drop by a factor of roughly two, across all brands. This phenomenon affects
all ink observations in 2014 and 2015, after which, observations seem to return to normal in 2016.
There is no industry event over that period that explains the drop and return in sales, and the industry
reports show no major changes in those years either. I suspect one large retailer simply dropped out
of the Nielsen scanner program for the two years, and returned afterward. I multiplicatively adjust
ink sales over this window by taking the monthly average outside of 2014-2015, the monthly average
within 2014-2015, and multiplying unit sales of ink in 2014-2015 by the ratio of the two. I report
monthly ink sales by brand before and after this adjustment in Appendix Table A3.
Lastly, I adjust all prices with BLS monthly CPI data, using 2006 as the base year. For inks, I
also generate a per-page price by dividing reported ink yield by cartridge price. I break down page
sales by supplier and by color in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1: Observed Prices and Quantities Per Page of Ink
BCMY B CMY BCMY B+CMY
Pages Pages Pages Price Price
OEM 13 21 9.4 $ 0.116 $ 0.138
Reman. 1.7 5.1 1.5 $ 0.076 $ 0.088
Quantities are reported in billions of pages. There are four color types among cartridges: black ink (B),
tricolor (CMY), single color (C, M, or Y), and black plus color (BCMY). It is an industry-wide yield-labelling
convention that one page of BCMY ink is equivalent to a page of B and a page of CMY ink - that is, a 300-page
BCMY cartridge does about as much printing as a 300-page B and 300-page CMY cartridge combined. For
this reason, it is appropriate to compare the per-page price of BCMY to the sum of the per-page prices of B
and CMY. Additionally, there are very few observations of only a C, M, or Y ink cartridge being sold, and
in all cases where they are sold, there is also either a BCMY or CMY option available, or the single-color
cartridges are often sold bundled together - these bundles are functionally equivalent to CMY cartridges, and I
treat them as such in the data. The differences in the average prices is due in some part to selection: some ink
families offer only BCMY catridges, and some offer only B and CMY, with the later families tending to be
more expensive.
The final data sample includes sales of 372 printer models with an average price of $64.19; sales
by OEMs in each the 84 ink families with an average cartridge price of $28.13 and per-page price of
13.1 cents; and sales by remanufacturers in 46 of the ink families with an average cartridge price of
$15.46 and page price of 8.4 cents.
Total revenue for inks and printers are reported by brand in Table 1.2. As mentioned above,
the market is fairly concentrated, with HP making up roughly half of the printer sales.20 Each firm
makes the vast majority of its revenue from ink, rather than printer sales, confirming the common
casual observation that these firms are “really” selling ink, not printers.
1.3.3 Descriptive Analysis
The following subsections describe some basic patterns that arise in the data, and discuss the salient
features necessary for the structural model. I discuss first the changes in printer technology over the
20These shares are roughly in line with Statista’s estimated market shares, averaged by-year from Statista’s
industry report “Market share held by hardcopy peripherals vendors in the U.S. 2009-2013”. Statista reports
53.9% share for HP, 4.8% share for Lexmark, 9.1% share for Epson, 14.5% share for Canon These shares
do not sum to 100% because that report includes an “Other” category. The Statista report places Kodak in
this category, and so does not report Kodak’s market share. Additionally, Lexmark sold many more printers
in the first few years of the data sample, and by 2009, its production had dropped significantly, accounting
for its low share in the Statista data. Lastly, the Statista data sample includes large-format, plotter, and
dye-sublimation printers used in large offices or for specialty jobs, which fall outside the market definition I
use and would not be sold in retail stores.
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Table 1.2: Total revenue over the full data sample
Ink Revenue Printer Revenue Market Share
($Millions) ($Millions) (Sample)
HP 2,192 227 45.3%
Lexmark 299 80 16.0%
Epson 286 89 17.8%
Canon 279 65 13.0%
Kodak 58 28 5.6%
Brother 45 12 2.4%
Revenues and sample market shares are calculated using Nielsen RMS data over the full sample window for
the data. Sample market shares may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
sample. Then I discuss the OEMs’ pricing responses to remanufacturer entry, and last, the OEMs’
non-price responses to remanufacturer entry.
I. Technological Improvements
Because printers are a durable technology good, one concern for demand estimation is that
consumers may delay purchase due to expectations about future industry-level product improvements,
as in Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012). Table 1.3 reports characteristics and average prices for the
printers in the data sample. It is clear that consumers are, for example, willing to pay more for a faster
printer, and for printers with scanners, and that there is dispersion in these printer characteristics.
Table 1.3: Observed Prices and Characteristics of Printers
Share Mean Price
Total - $64.67
Strong Chip 0.63 $67.68
Weak Chip 0.37 $58.58
Scanner 0.77 $71.56
No Scanner 0.23 $42.02
PPM > 20 0.44 $71.97
PPM ≤ 20 0.56 $53.19
Resolution > 4800 0.22 $66.81
Resolution ≤ 4800 0.78 $64.48
However, there is little improvement in industry-level technical specifications, and little decrease
in average price for the printers over the 11-year panel. While there is movement over time, there
is not clear evidence of a steady technological progress or price decrease, as in the camcorder data
from the Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012).
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Figure 3 presents a time series for average price of printers, and Figure 4 presents a time series
for the average technical specifications of printers sold over the sample. In both, the 11-year sample
is broken into 22 six-month periods. In Figure 3, sales-weighted mean printer price is averaged over
previous four six-month periods.21 Although there are some intervals of decreasing prices, there are
also periods of increasing prices, and mean price is roughly the same at the end of the sample as it
was in the beginning.
Figure 3: Rolling Price Average
Rolling price averages calculated from Nielsen RMS data. Each observation is the quantity-weighted average
price over the previous two years.
In Figure 4, the quantity-weighted averages are taken over the previous three six-month periods.
Each y-axis corresponds with a different technical specification: starting at the top left, (A) shows
that print speed (measured in pages-per-minutes) does not improve over the 11-year sample for either
category, and actually decreases on average. (B) shows that black-and-white resolution, measured in
horizontal DPI (dots per inch), does not improve monotonically, although it is higher on average at
the end of the sample than at the beginning. However, the quality of printed text does not improve
beyond 600x600 DPI for most fonts and text sizes - resolution in excess of this DPI generally only
benefits photographs. Notably, (C) shows that color resolution does not improve appreciably over
the sample, and in fact falls on average over the same window where black-and-white resolution
21For example, the first observation uses average price from the first and second halves of 2007 and the first
and second halves of 2006. I use four periods here to eliminate seasonal effects in printer prices
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improves. Lastly, (D) and (E) show that over the sample window, printers do not get appreciably
smaller (measured by footprint) or lighter (by weight).
15
Figure 4: Rolling Technical Specification Averages
Bases on sales quantities from Nielsen RMS data.
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As a final check, I break out the technical spec paths into printer-only and multifunction printer
categories, where a multifunction printer is defined as any machine that is capable of one of the
following: scanning, directly copying, and/or faxing documents. Over the data sample, the market
share of multifunction printers grows steadily from 60% to about 90%. That vast majority of printers
throughout the sample are capable of color-printing. Even after separating the data in this way, there
are is still not clear evidence of steady improvement in either price or technology. For this reason,
it is unlikely that consumer expectations about future printer prices or characteristics play a role in
purchase decisions, and so in the modeling step, it is not necessary to consider strategic delay of
purchase by consumers.
II. Price Variation
To discuss price variation, it is useful to define two key dates for each ink family: (1) the
introduction date for the family is the date of the first sale by the OEM, and (2) the entry date for
the remanufacturer is the date of the first non-OEM sale in that ink family. Prices of ink and printers
both tend to react to remanufacturer entry, but have comparatively little variation over time otherwise.
After the remanufacturer enters, mean OEM price falls by 27% on average. The difference in
mean prices between OEMs (after remanufacturer entry) and remanufacturers of the same family
is about 39% on average. Unsurprisingly, almost all OEM prices are higher than their respective
remanufacturers’ prices.
However, the coefficient of variation (sample standard deviation divided by mean) by month
for OEM ink prices in the pre-remanufacturer period is only 0.11 on average across families.
For remanufacturer prices, it is 0.14. In other words, prices are mostly stable over time, with a
comparatively large amount of price variation being explained by the presence or absence of the
remanufacturer.
There is similar dispersion in printer prices. There is some seasonality in printer prices that isn’t
present in ink prices, which I adjust for multiplicatively. The average absolute percent-change in
mean printer family price is 38% from the pre-remanufacturer period to the post-remanufacturer
period, and on average, prices fall by 7% from the pre- to post-remanufacturer period. There is more
variation over time within these two periods for printer prices: the mean coefficient of variation over
time is 0.29 within the pre-remanufacturer period and 0.36 in the post-remanufacturer period. In
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this sense, it appears that the printer prices, not ink prices, are how OEMs choose to react to market
forces.
This is useful for two reasons; first, it means that consumers can reasonably use ink prices on
the day of their printer purchase to predict future ink prices, and these predictions will be roughly
correct, until a remanufacturer enters. There is not strong evidence that consumers are sophisticated
enough to build expectations over the timing of the remanufacturer entry event; consumer advocates
often advise consumers to check for remanufacturer availability, but they don’t advise consumers
to (for example) research how long printer models have been on the market so they can guess how
much longer they’d have to wait for a remanufactured ink option.
Second, this means that average non-f ink prices may be a valid instrument for firm f ’s printer
prices. This follows from the classic Berry (1994) logic regarding the use of non-f characteristics as
an instrument for f ’s price - the price of non-f ink are excluded from consumer utility functions for
printer f , but through firm first-order conditions, are correlated with printer prices, since firm f has
incentives to cut printer prices if its rivals are offering lower ink prices.
III. Remanufacturer Entry Process
Figure 5 shows the impact of smart chips on entry timing among the remanufacturers. On the
x-axis is ink family “age,” defined as the number of months since the family’s introduction. The
observations are split into those families that have a strong chip, in red, and those that have a weak
chip, in blue. On the y-axis is the probability that a family has already experienced the remanufacturer
entry data by the time it reaches a given age. For example, at age 15 months, no smart-chipped
families face remanufacturer competition, but 5% of non-chipped do.
Figure 5 shows that while it always takes some number of months for the remanufacturer to
collect enough empty cartridges to enter the market, the smart chipping systems tend to be effective
in delaying entry even further. For any given age, the families with weak chips are 65% more likely
to face a remanufacturer than those with strong chips. Notably, most of the printers that implement
the chip belong to HP, which tends to sell the most printers, and so also offer the highest potential
reward for successful entry by the remanufacturers.
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Figure 5: Observed Probability of Remanufacturer Presence by Age
Age is defined as the number of months since a printer family’s introduction. Probabilities are calculated as
the count of families which face a remanufacturer by each age, divided by the count of families in the data at
each age.
IV. OEM Printer Exit Process
The other important type of firm dynamic is the OEMs’ decision to reduce sales of printers
whose ink faces a remanufacturer. At a high level, monthly printer sales fall on average after the
remanufacturers enter. Across all families, in pre-remanufacturer months, each printer model sells an
average of 902 units per month, and in post-remanufacturer months (before printer exit), each model
sells an average of 718 units per month - despite the fact that remanufacturer entry event should
increase demand for the impacted printers, since it gives consumers more ink options.
Additionally, many printer models are discontinued over the course of the data sample, and I
show that the timings of these discontinuations correspond with remanufacturer entry. First, define
the date of discontinuation by an “exit” event: exit occurs in the first month where sales fall below
0.01% of lifetime sales.22
22The data is retail sales, so there are often periods where stores are still selling a few printer models per
month, even after OEMs have stopped producing them. For validation, I use a few alternative thresholds to
define exit as well, and find similar results.
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Figure 6: Observed Share of Printers Post-Exit by Age
Share of post-exit printers are calculated as the count of printer models which have experienced the exit event
at each age (in months), divided by the count of printer models at each age (whether or not they are still on the
market). Censored data is not included in these counts.
Figure 5 plots the share of printer models that have experienced exit by each age. The blue
line represents models that have faced remanufacturer entry, and red represents those that have not.
At each age, there is a greater share of printers that have exited among those facing an entrant.23
Additionally, because ink chips affects the rate of R entry, it is also linked to market lifecycle: the
average time on the market from introduction to exit is 24.75 months among all printers, but 26.48
months among those with chipped ink, and 22.55 months among those without.
I also use a Cox regression, a survival analysis technique, to show the statistical significance of
the relationship between remanufacturer entry and printer exit. Printer exit is modeled as a stochastic
survival event which depends on remanufacturer presence. Use t to denote printer age, and Ti the
age of printer i at its exit date. Let Rti be a dummy for the presence of remanufacturer for printer
23The data is downward-sloping over some intervals because some printer models are right-censored - i.e. the
data sample ends before they experience their exit event.
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model i at age t. Define hazard rate h(t, Rti), the probability of exit occurring within the month for
a printer model of age t.
Of particular interest is the hazard rate ratio h(t,Rti=1)h(t,Rti=0) .
24 I use a Cox regression, Cox (1972),
Fisher and Yin (1999), to estimate this ratio. The Cox specification for time-dependant covariates is:
h(t, Rt = 1)
h(t, Rt = 0)
= exp(βRt)
The Cox regression assumes proportional hazard rates: that is, the hazard rate ratio does not
change over time, even though the two hazard rates might (this assumption is easily tested in
post-estimation). I use this technique because it does not require directly estimating either hazard
rate, and is non-parametric in estimating the base hazard rate, h(t, Rt = 0). Additionally, the Cox
regression easily handles right-censored data with individuals that that never experience the failure
event. For this analysis, I drop all left-censored printer models - defined as the printers that have
some sales in the first month of the data. However, I do not need to drop printer models whose ink
families are left-censored.
This analysis treats Rt as an exogenous event with respect to the characteristics of each printer
i and other events which contribute to printer i’s exit. This is likely not the case, but note that in
general, the characteristics of i that make it more appealing for a remanufacturer to enter its ink
(higher quality and sales of the printer, a higher profit margin on the associated ink, etc), also make
the printer manufacturing less likely to want to remove the printer from the market, all else equal.
For these reasons, the parameter estimate for β is more likely biased downward, not upward.












where j indexes the failure ages T1, ..., Tj , ..., TD. For each j, Dj is the set of all indexes of models
that exit at age Tj ; dj is the number of failures that take place at age Tj ; and Sj is the set of all
indexes of models that do not exit before reaching age Tj .
24For now, I only want to identify whether this ratio is significantly greater than 1 - the true nature of the
relationship between remanufacturer entry and printer model exit will require a structural model.
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Table 1.4: Cox Regression Results
Specification (1) (2) (3)
Hazard Ratio 1.283∗∗ 1.190 1.270∗
(0.161) (0.151) (0.158)
Schoenfeld Residual χ2 stat 1.50 2.36 1.88
Printer Models 299 299 299
Exit Events Observed 263 261 266
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Notes: Results from estimation under the three specifications. Main specification is (1), which shows that
remanufacturer entry increase the odds of printer exit by 28.3% in each following month
Table 2 reports results for each of three threshold definitions for the exit event. Specification
(1) is the main specification (the first date when sales are less than 0.01% of lifetime sales), and the
others are for validation. Specification (2) uses the first date when sales are 0 for the month, and (3)
uses the first date when sales are less than 1% of mean monthly sales (among all months with sales
recorded). These alternative specifications change a small number of observations from ending in
right-censoring to ending in the exit event.
Under the main specification, remanufacturer entry increases the odds of printer exit by 28.3% in
each month.25 This is evidence that OEMs engage in some deliberate portfolio management to avoid
competition by remanufacturers - the full structural model attempts to capture the costs associated
with discontinuation and introduction of ink and printer families.
1.4 Conclusion
The OEMs in the printer and ink industry choose to charge low prices for printers and high prices
for ink. In the absence of third-party ink producers, this strategy would allow them to use ink sales
as a “metering” device for price discrimination without much difficulty. However, the presence of
these third-parties has pushed the OEMs to innovate a variety of techniques such as smart-chips and
physical designs for their ink cartridges to raise the costs of cartridge remanufacture. In addition, there
25Also reported are the results of the Schoenfeld scaled residual test (Grambsch and Therneau (1994)), a test
for correlation of the hazard ratio with time. The relevant test statistic is χ2 with one degree of freedom. In
the main specification, the model fails to reject the hypothesis that the hazard ratio is uncorrelated with time
at the 80% level.
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is evidence of a dynamic strategy of shutting down product lines that the third-parties successfully
enter.
An alternative to these strategies would be to simply change the business model and give up
on the razor-and-blades model altogether, charging a high price for printers and low price for ink
cartridges. Then the ink remanufacturers may even improve profits for the OEMs, by offering
lower-price ink to consumers. In the years after the data window, Epson has grown its Eco-tank
line, which follows a strategy like this, and in 2020, HP announced that it would shift toward selling
printers with ink contracts that commit the firm to cheap ink options for the life of the printer. These
changes have evolved slowly, suggesting that the benefits from the razor-and-blades strategy are
large, and perhaps that the threat the ink remanufacturers pose to OEMs has grown only slowly over
time. Another cause may be that the consumer base has changed over time, with consumers less
dispersed in their intensity of use for ink (decreasing the benefits from price discrimination), or with
the highest-intensity ink users finding alternatives to printing.
This industry is a useful case study in how the razor-and-blades model can prove to be fragile,
and how the model itself provides incentives and opportunities for sometimes costly RRC measures
by OEMs against third parties.
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CHAPTER 2: EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS
2.1 Introduction
I now build on Chapter 1 by focusing on the most salient example of costly RRC, the smart-chips
installed in the ink cartridges. I use the data constructed and described in Chapter 1 to empirically
evaluate how remaufacturers’ costs and consumers’ prices are impacted by HP and Lexmark’s strong,
integrated chips, compared to Canon, Epson, and Brother’s weaker chips.
To do so, I first propose a structural demand model with forward-looking consumers who maxi-
mize lifetime utility from printer use, and who take into account the availability of remanufactured ink
options when making printer purchases. The supply side is made of OEM firms who compete both
with remanufacturers and with each other in oligopoly competition, and are also forward-looking
in their pricing decisions. I use this model to recover marginal costs of production, and I estimate
that strong chips raise marginal costs by 40% for remanufacturers, compared to the weaker chips.
I also simulate some regulatory counterfactuals; I find that efficiency gains from eliminating the
entry-deterrence effect of the chip are small - $109, 000 per month on average, but the gains from
eliminating the marginal cost effect are bigger - $3.8 million per month, with most gains collected by
consumers.
2.2 Model
I consider an oligopoly game in discrete time, denoted by t, with an infinite horizon. There are
three types of players: consumers, OEM firms, and remanufacturers. There are two types of goods:
printers, which are durable, and ink, which perishes if not consumed. For simplicity, I will assume
each family contains only one printer model, so that the terms “model” and “family” are equivalent.
In the empirical model, I discuss the changes I make to allow multiple models per family.
Each period, massMt of consumers arrive, and each consumer either buys a printer or disappears
forever. Consumers take prices as given. They get utility from printing, which requires holding a
printer model j from the set of all printer models Jt, and purchasing some quantity of the compatible
ink, also denoted by model j. Consumers maximize the expected value of their future utility by
choice of printer purchase, and then consuming ink (or by choosing no printer). The consumers’ first
ink purchase takes place the period after their printer purchase. They can only hold one printer, and
cannot dispose of it until it breaks, which occurs each period with probability δ. After a consumer’s
printer breaks, they disappear as well.
The OEM firms are denoted by f = 1, 2, ..., F . They produce both printers and ink, and choose
prices for both. Each firm f produces the printer models in set Jft ⊂ Jt.
The remanufacturers produce only ink, and are modeled as a single competitive fringe, which I
denote by R for ease of discussion. In each period, there is a chance R will successfully enter each ink
market, and after it does so, R will remain active in that market forever. R engages in differentiated
Bertrand competition against the OEM after entry, where R sells a weakly lower-quality product.
In each period t, define the vector of states ωt, which includes all printer offerings and character-
istics, the presence or absence of R in each market, and the number of consumers who hold each
printer. The order of events is as follows:
1. All players observe state ωt. All firms play a pricing game, setting ink and printer prices.
2. Consumers make purchases and earn utility. Printers break or survive.
3. R either enters or fails to enter each market where it is not already present.
In the next two subsections I describe in depth the demand side and supply side for the model.
2.2.1 Demand
I first present the individual consumer’s two-good problem, where utility is generated by using ink,
and the marginal utility of ink varies by printer and by ink supplier (OEM or R). I then aggregate
over the mass M of consumers to derive demand functions for the two goods.
I. Ink Purchase
The consumer can buy ink j from the OEM fj , at price p
f
jt per page, or from R at price p
R
jt.




exp(Xjλ+ ξjs − ζijt1{k = R}) · qγ − pkjtq,
where k denotes the ink’s producer - either OEM f , or R. This assumes the consumer uses only f ’s
ink or only R’s ink in period t; the consumer does not mix inks within the same month, but may
choose different suppliers from one month to the next. λ is the vector of utility parameters for how
characteristics Xj affect the marginal utility of ink. Xj includes observed characteristics like the
printer’s speed and the presence of a scanner. The term γ ∈ (0, 1) is a curvature parameter for the
utility of ink1.
ξjs is a structural error, and it can be thought of as a cohort-product fixed-effect. It is observable
to the consumers, but not the econometrician, and is made up of components ξj , the time-invariant
characteristics of the printer, including traits like size or how loud the printer is, and a component
that varies across cohorts, ξs. The idea here is that printers are marketed, packaged, and physically
placed in different ways in different time periods; this results in different consumer perceptions of
econometrically unobserved characteristics like style or aesthetics. I assume the perception that is
established among printer buyers in period s is maintained over the life of the printer, so that they
always receive the same additional amount of marginal utility in each period from those unobserved
characteristics.
Last, ζijt is consumer i’s preference against R ink, as opposed to OEM ink. It is a random
variable with support [0,∞]. Owners of printer j receive a new ζijt, drawn iid from CDF Fjt(ζ)
each period. The intuition is that printer j owners observe the R ink in each period, and update their
judgements about how “close” in quality it is to the OEM ink, establishing a shared Fjt(ζ). Then
each consumer considers their own taste for the month - perhaps considering the importance of the
jobs they are printing - and receives draw ζijt.
Conditional on holding printer j, the consumer maximizes utility by choice of q and k. After












1Utility is isoelastic with price elasticity of demand 1γ−1 among the consumers who own printer j, in the
periods when no R option is available
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jt) = 0 otherwise. The consumer’s indirect utility









γ−1 (γ · exp(Xjλ+ ξjs − ζijt · 1{k = R}))
1
1−γ (γ−1 − 1). (2.2)
Note the subscript s in qkijs(·) and vijs(·) implicitly makes them both functions of the cohort in which
the printer was purchased.
II. Printer Purchase
The consumer must hold a printer in order to print. A consumer can only hold one printer at
a time. There is no resale market, and the consumer cannot dispose of their printer until it breaks,
which occurs each period with probability δ. This value is publicly known and identical for all
printers.
At the beginning of each period, the supply side offers the consumer the set of printers Jt and




jt. If the consumer holds a printer, he buys ink
according to (2.1). If not, the consumer buys the printer that offers the highest expected net present
utility, or else chooses the outside option (no printer) and leaves the game forever.
The consumer has discount factor β, and builds expectations about future utility from ink use
over the life of the printer, based on future prices and R’s ink qualities. The expected net present






j,s+t)]− pPjs +Xjτ + εijs, (2.3)
where τ is the utility parameter for the additional net present utility of the observed characteristics for
printer j beyond what is earned by printing. For example, if the printer has a scanner, the consumer
may get some utility from it, even when doing no printing. εijs is the additional net present utility
from unobserved characteristics of the printer not captured by ξjs. It is drawn independently across
each j and time period from the standard Extreme Value Type 1 (logit) distribution. The expectation
is over both future prices and future ζij,s+t draws - implicitly, this means the expectation is also over
future Fj,s+t(ζ)’s. Note also that since the first ink purchase is made in the period after the printer
purchase, and the ζ draws are independent over time, the expectation itself does not depend on i. For
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a printer j purchased in time s, ξjs is fixed over time - this is why the appropriate subscript for the
indirect utility is vijs(·), and not vij,s+t(·). The consumer maximizes UPijs by choice of j, or chooses
the outside option (UP0s = 0) if no j offers positive net present utility.
III. Aggregation I aggregate demand across consumers to collect industry-level demand func-
tions for each good. These industry demand functions are also functions of the industry state ωt,
which is made up of each printer j’s characteristics ωjt, which include:
• fj , the OEM that produces the model
• Rjt, an indicator with value 0 if R has not entered yet, and 1 if it has
• RRCj , an indicator with value 0 if the RRC measure is not implemented, and 1 if it is
• Xj the econometrically observable qualities of the printer
• ξjs, the econometrically unobserved (printing-relevant) qualities of the printer
• Ajt, the age of the model (periods since its introduction)
• Fjt·, the CDF of ζ draws.
• njt, the vector containing all previous printer sales.
In period t, each j has three associated prices (generated by a pricing game which I describe in






jt can be treated as∞ if Rjt = 0. Let pt be the (3× |J|)
vector of all prices in time t.
Then denote market demand for each printer by QPj (pt, ωt). This demand follows from the
standard logit aggregation. Let the UPijs from (2.3) be equal to V
P
js + εijs. Then in each period t,










and so market demand is
QPj (pt, ωt) = Mt · sj(pt;ωt).
Each ξjs is fixed over time, so the ink demand equations depend on the whole history of printer sales,
contained in vector njt. Denote demand for f ’s ink by Q
f
j (pt, ωt) and R’s ink by Q
R
j (pt, ωt). Then:
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where each qfijs(·) is as defined in equation (2.1), and similarly,
QRj (pt, ωt) =
t∑
s=1








pinning down industry-level demand for each printer and ink product, in each period.
2.2.2 Supply
In this subsection, I describe the production technology for the two types of firms, and formally
define the pricing games for both ink and printers.
Because R is modeled as a competitive fringe, it does not internalize the impact of its pricing
and entry decisions across different js - as a result, it is possible to discuss R’s behavior in the market
for one j or any subset of all js without any loss of generality.
Ink j is produced at a constant marginal cost cfjt for the OEM, and c
R





Printer j is produced at constant marginal cost cPjt. R attempts to enter each market j each period.
I assume its probability of success is increasing in Ajt, the age of the printer, and decreasing in
RRCjt, the indicator for “strong chip” use. Once the entry cost is incurred, R begins competing
with the OEM in an differentiated Bertrand pricing game (R producing the low quality product), and
continues to do so forever.
I. Pricing Stage
Consumers do not buy ink in the period in which they buy their printers,2 so the firm has no way
to credibly commit to cheaper ink for the purpose of selling more printers - since consumers are not






2In practice, all printers in the data come bundled with some quantity of ink out of the box, so consumers are
able to do some printing before they buy more ink.
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This is equal to the per-printer quantity of printing among the consumers who choose OEM ink. In
the periods where R is present for ink j, OEM f ’s profit from ink among holders printer j, purchased











jt) · njs(1− δ)
t−s,
where njs is the number of consumers who purchased the printer in cohort s. ζ∗ is the value of ζijt
for the marginal consumer (the consumer who is indifferent between OEM and R ink), given prices
and printer characteristics. That is, for each (j, t) pair, ζ∗jt solves:
(pRjt)
γ
γ−1 (γ · exp(Xjλ+ ξjs − ζ∗jt))
1
1−γ (γ−1 − 1) = (pfjt)
γ
γ−1 (γ · exp(Xjλ+ ξjs))
1
1−γ (γ−1 − 1)
The solution is ζ∗jt = γln(p
f
jt)−γln(pRjt) for each (j, t) pair. As a tie-breaking rule, let the indifferent
consumer choose f ’s ink. Given the Bertrand competition assumption, the OEM’s FOC for prices is
(suppressing subscripts):
(1− F (ζ∗)) = (pf − cf ) · [F ′(ζ∗) γ
pf
















which is the per-printer quantity of printing among the consumers who choose R ink. R’s profit in t
among printer j owners who bought in period t′ can be written as:
ΠRjt = (p
R
jt − cRjt)F (ζ∗jt) · q̃Rjt(pRjt) · njs(1− δ)t−s,
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and R’s FOC is (again, suppressing subscripts):
0 = F (ζ∗) + (pR − cR)[F ′(ζ∗)−γ
pR
+ F (ζ∗) · 1
pR(1− γ)
+ (2.7)











Note that these FOCs do not depend on printer characteristics Xj , or, more importantly, ξjs - this is
a result of the isoelastic utility for ink. Thus, for any j, the price which maximizes profits among
the buyers of j in time s maximizes profits among all j-owners. As long as each Fjt(ζ) is strictly
increasing and continuously differentiable over its support, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in
prices for the ink pricing stage.
In printers, each OEM firm is a price-setting oligopolist. It is well established that when facing
logit demand, a multiproduct oligopolist will choose a single price-minus-marginal-cost markup for
all products (see Anderson and de Palma 1992). Here, the appropriate markup should internalize the
expected future ink profits for each printer sold (as a negative marginal cost). For a printer j sold in





where the expectation is taken over R’s entry, future Fjt(ζ)’s, and, future marginal costs. π
f
j,s+t is




jt − cPjt +Bjt(ωt) (2.9)
for all j ∈ Jf . Liu (2006) shows that there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium with each firm







where each si is given by equation (2.4), and σε is the standard deviation of the standard logit error.
31
The Nash equilibrium which uses this solution completely internalizes the dynamic considera-
tions in the pricing decisions, and can be found for any state ωt. Thus D∗ft(ωt) ·
∑
i∈Jft si(ωt) ·M
can be interpreted as f ’s net present value from each printer sold in state ωt.
2.3 Estimation
In this section I discuss my estimation strategy for the consumer preference parameters and marginal
costs described in the previous section. I then describe the specification for the sources of uncertainty
in the model, the empirical construction of consumer expectations, and lastly, the estimation algorithm
I use.
2.3.1 Strategy
I observe multiple printer models for most ink families. This is not a problem for estimation, but
for clarity of notation, I will use j to represent an printer model, and when necessary to denote an
ink family as opposed to just a printer, I will use j̃ to represent the corresponding ink family. Note




, For notational simplicity, I will opt for j, rather j̃ where they are equivalent.
The estimation strategy is similar to Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). I first assume a
parametric form for the Fjt(ζ)’s - I assume the exponential CDF with mean µjt for each. Then,
given any set of parameters θ = {λ, τ, γ, β, δ}, I select the distribution parameters µjtfor Fjt(ζ) to
exactly match the predicted OEM ink share to observed share (as I will show, these shares do not
depend on the values of the ξjs’s). I then select each ξjs to match each predicted printer market share
to the observed market share. The ξjs’s are interacted with product characteristics and a vector of
standard Berry-style instruments to produce a set of moment conditions. I also estimate the number
of “surviving” printers held by consumers (where feasible) to generate predicted ink sales for about a
quarter of the month-ink family observations, and create a vector of moment conditions that matches
these predicted ink sales to observed ink sales in the data. These moments are then used to produce
an objective function, minimized by a standard iterated GMM routine.
As is common in the literature for estimating systems of demand with consumer discount rates,
I do not estimate the discount factor β, and instead set it to 0.99 at the month level. I also do not
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estimate δ, the breakdown rate for printers, which would be similarly difficult to identify. Instead, I
use industry estimates and survey data suggesting printer lifespan of 3-5 years3 4 to select value of
0.015 at the monthly level, which corresponds with a median printer lifespan of approximately 4
years. I let the market size for printers be the number of U.S. households in each year.
Lastly, I pool inks, rather than estimating a separate demand system for colored ink and black
ink. It is conventional that one page of a cartridge classified as black-plus-color (BCMY) ink is equal
to one page of black (B) plus one page of color (CMY). I use a page of BCMY as the standard unit
of printing, so that the quantity of printing sold for a given family is the number BCMY pages sold,
plus half of the number of B pages, plus half of the number of CMY pages sold. For prices, I take
the quantity-weighted average of per-page BCMY, B, and CMY prices (after adjusting appropriately
for the labelling conventions discussed).
2.3.2 Specification
Each Fjt(ζ) is assumed to take the exponential CDF, a convenient choice because it has one parameter,
(without loss of generality, µjt). Importantly, because I do not have consumer-level data, I cannot
observe the ink use associated with each printer model j, only the ink use for a family j̃, with
some history of printer sales, usually including multiple models. For this reason, I assume that
µjt = µj̃t for all j. This is equivalent to assuming that the distribution of taste for OEM vs R ink is a
characteristic of the inks, and it does not interact (or, from the perspective of the consumers does not
observably interact) with printer characteristics differently within a family. Then, in period t, the

































where Hjt ≡ µjt+(1−γ)µjt(1−γ) .
Then the ratio of (2.11) to (2.12) is the predicted ratio of OEM sales to R sales, given any set of








This ratio does not depend on ξjs, so this relationship makes it possible to identify each unique µjt
which would set the observed ratio of OEM sales to R sales equal to the predicted ratio, given any set
of parameters. Note that each µjt is an “exact match” for the data, given γ and prices.5
Additionally, with the assumptions above, there are closed-form solutions for the constant




γ(1− γ) + µ
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where H = (1−γ)+µ(1−γ)µ as before. And lastly, by (2.5), c
f = γpf in the periods with no R present.
Thus, the marginal costs for ink are determined in the same exact-match sense as the µjt’s.
5There are some observations where the price of the remanufactured ink is higher than the OEM ink, and the
remanufactured ink still has nonzero market share - these make up less than 5% of the ink observations, and I
believe they are due mostly to sampling error, given the aggregated nature of the data, and for more than two
thirds, the difference is smaller than two cents per page. These observations are not rationalizable with this
modeling setup, so for now, I treat them as missing data.
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2.3.3 Consumer Expectations
Consumers build expectations over both future prices and future qualities of the R ink, which can
be understood as the µjt’s.6 As discussed, it is unlikely that consumers are sophisticated in their
expectations about R’s arrival, and further, ink prices tend to be fairly stable before and after R’s
arrival (though stable at different levels). For these reasons, I let consumers expect that future prices
will be equal to current prices (for both OEM and R inks) - then, when R enters, they may receive
some unexpected additional “surprise” utility from the cheaper ink.
I do however observe that the µjt’s can be volatile. For this reason, once R is present, I let
consumers use the backwards-looking “empirical” distribution of µjt’s to build their expectations
about future µjt’s.
2.3.4 Estimation Algorithm
The algorithm is similar to Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). The first step is to select a set of
candidate parameters θ̂ ≡ (λ̂, τ̂ , γ̂), and then generate vector µ̂, by numerically searching for the
vector of values that sets (2.13) equal to ratio of the observed OEM to R sales.7 Then I select the
values of ξjs(θ̂), a function of the parameters, which generate the mean value of the expected net
present utilities in (2.3) that rationalize the observed printer market shares. Fortunately, these ξjs(θ̂)’s
have an analytical solution:
ξjs(θ̂) = (1− γ̂)ln
[





where s̄jt and s̄0t are the observed market shares for printer j and the outside option in time t,
respectively, and each v̂ijs(·, ·) is equal to each vijs(·, ·) evaluated at θ = θ̂ and ξjs = 0 .
I generate the moment conditions for the GMM routine from the ξjs(θ̂)’s, which are mean 0 at
the true value of parameters, θ̂ = θ0, and whose interactions with the Xj’s are assumed to be mean 0
at the true parameter values as well.
6Technically, each consumer also builds expectations over their ζijt draw, which depends on µjt.
7Note that it is not necessary to jointly estimate the marginal costs within the algorithm, as is sometimes the
case - they are instead collected post-estimation
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In addition, I construct some typical Berry (1994)-style instrumental variables which are based
on the the non-j product characteristics. First, I use the means of allXj’s in time t among the printers
not produced by firm fj . Second, while RRCj is unlikely to be exogenous to the ξjs(θ̂)’s (firms that
know they have better protection for R may be more willing to invest in higher unobservable quality),
non-j̃ mean RRCj in t is likely exogenous to ξ, and since it affects future ink profits for firms, it
will affect their printer prices, making it a valid instrument. For the same reason, the mean of the
indicators Rjt for remanufacturer presence among non-j̃ printers is a valid instrument as well. And
last, as discussed in the data section, there is also evidence that the mean of non-fj OEM ink prices
is also a valid instrument.
Then denote the matrix of observable characteristics and instruments by Z. Let ξ(θ0) be the
vector of all ξjs(θ0)’s. The moment conditions can then be represented as:
E[Z ′ξ(θ0)] = Gz = 0,
I include another set of moments as well, based on ink sales. This is an important step, because
otherwise the estimation routine uses only printer sales data to estimate ink sales and consumer
preferences for ink. I first construct the estimated base of “surviving” printers j from each cohort s
in period t, equal to the observed number of sales, Q̄Pjs times (1− δ)t−s. Then if R is present, for
















where the integral term is given by the value in (2.1) if k = f , and by the value in (2.2) if k = R,
with each qkijs(·) using ξjs(θ̂).














These predicted quantities should match the observed quantities of ink sales (among the ink








for k = f,R. It is necessary to scale these terms into the same units as the ξ’s - this
is done by computing the term that would need to be added inside the exp(·) in the utility function in
order to set each ηk
j̃t











These errors have a non-structural interpretation. At the true parameter values, they provide two
additional moment conditions:
E[ηf ] = E[ηR] = Gf = GR = 0,
Then the GMM estimator is
θ̄ = argminθG
′W−1G,
where G = [Gz, Gf , GR], with weighting matrix W−1 a consistent estimator of E[GG′], computed
by the standard iterated GMM method. The standard errors for the parameters are computed using
the standard Newey and West (1987) method.
2.4 Results
Here I report the preference parameter and marginal cost estimates, as well as estimates of consumer
and producer surplus. I then simulate some counterfactuals: first the cases where remanufacturers
are all present or all absent, and then simulating the market under different versions of a regulatory
order against the ink chips.
2.4.1 Preference Parameters and Interpretation
I run the estimation routine with several different sets of observables in X, but I find that the
observable technical specs of the printers have little explanatory power. This is perhaps unsurprising,
given that the evolution of printer specifications in the industry (speed, resolution, weight, footprint,
etc) has been somewhat stagnant over the sample period - if improved technical specifications were
very important to consumers, it is likely firms would have had sufficient incentives to invest in more
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technological innovation. I do however find that the presence of a scanner is a significant demand
shifter when included in the estimation routine alone, and I report these preference parameters in
Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Preference Parameters
Cons Scanner Cons Scanner γ
(printing) (printing) (non-printing) (non-printing)
Estimate 0.0973 0.0352 -96.37 5.77 0.547
(0.198) (0.0151) (4.58) (1.87) (0.002)
The intuition for these parameters is as follows. Removing the scanner from a printer that has
one reduces CS from printing by an average of $0.75 per month. The average willingness to pay for
a scanner of the quality that appears for these printers (but which can’t print) is $5.77, and last, the
value of γ implies that the elasticity of demand for ink among consumers with a printer that has no
remanufactured ink option is 2.17.
In addition, there are the quality parameters µjt for each (j, t) where a remanufactured ink
option was available. The intuition for these parameters is that a higher µjt corresponds with a lower
average shared perception of remanufactured ink quality in period t. Interpretation of these values is
not especially natural, but one way to think about them is to compare the ζijt draws they generate to
the discount that would exactly offset them. Table 2.2 collects the deciles of the µjt’s and reports the
share of consumers whose ζijt draw would be compensated by a 50% discount on ink. I find that the
strong chips do correspond with lower consumer perceptions of quality. This is reasonable, because
the strong chips may require physically modifying or replacing the chips, which means there is more
room for malfunction.
2.4.2 Cost Parameters
The three FOCs for ink pricing decisions (Equations (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7)) imply marginal costs










Table 2.2: µjt Deciles by Chip Strength
Strong Chips Weak Chips
µjt Deciles Consumers Compensated µjt Deciles Consumers Compensated
0.58 0.48 0.39 0.62
1.24 0.26 0.78 0.39
1.84 0.19 1.10 0.29
2.37 0.15 1.50 0.22
2.90 0.12 2.13 0.16
3.96 0.09 3.24 0.11
5.71 0.06 4.05 0.09
8.00 0.05 5.88 0.06
14.96 0.03 10.83 0.03
240.46 0.00 96.17 0.00
Observed Deciles of µjt’s collected from estimation routines, and the share of consumers whose ζijt draw
generated by those µjt’s would be adequately compensated by a 50% discount on the per-page price of ink.
Table 2.3: Marginal Cost Parameters: Ink





Marginal cost parameters and standard errors for OEM and R ink, in dollars per page of printer. I find that other
characteristics like average printer speed and average printer resolution for the ink family do not contribute to





1 RRC + ι
R
jt
Results are reported in Table 2.3. The unit is dollars per page of printing. I find the stronger chips
raise costs for the OEM by about 10%, and raise costs for the remanufacturers by about 40%.
To estimate printer costs, it is necessary to estimate each Bjt(ωt) from Equation (2.8). The
expectation requires integrating over 3 sources of uncertainty: R’s eventual entry date, the future
µjt’s, and the the future marginal costs for both R and the OEM. I integrate over the first by using
the empirical CDF of R’s entry, conditional on the age of each ink family and RRC level, smoothed
(linearly) over 10-month splines. I handle the future µjt’s similarly to consumer expectations
about µjt’s, but I allow the firms to see the full distribution of µjt’s, not just the backward-looking
distribution. For ink families that never experience R entry, I use the distribution of the µjt’s over
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the full dataset, conditional on RRC level. Last, I use the same strategy to integrate over cost draws,
now integrating over the empirical distribution of marginal costs pairs, first by family, then (if no
observed remanufacturer), by RRC level. Then, for each period t, I search for size-F vector of
D∗ft(ωt)’s which jointly solve the F-many equations from (2.10). Then equation (2.9) pins down the
constant marginal cost for each printer j in period t. I parameterize the cost of printers as a function





1 RRCj + αXXj + ι
P
jt
Results are reported in Table 2.4, in dollar units. I estimate average marginal cost of $127 -
implying losses of around $63 per printer. This is reasonably in line with the IHS Markit teardown
findings, which estimated that the HP Envy 4520, (retail price $70), had a cost of manufacturing of
$120. This printer is in my dataset, and I estimate that it has marginal cost $146 - as with all economic
marginal cost estimates, this marginal cost inclusive of more than just the cost of manufacturing - it
includes the cost of transportation, the opportunity cost of inventory, management and coordination,
and so on.
Table 2.4: Marginal Cost Parameters: Printers
Cons RRC Scanner PPM Res (1000 DPI)
Estimate 46.51 4.68 42.99 1.65 2.05
(3.44) (1.93) (1.79) (0.102) (0.569)
Note: PPM is a measure of printer speed, in pages-per-minute. “Res” refers to the horizontal resolution
of color printer, measured in 1000’s of DPI (dots per inch). For reference, text printing generally does not
improve in quality beyond 600x600 DPI for most fonts, and standard photo-quality printing is 4800x4800 DPI.
2.4.3 Welfare and Counterfactuals
Next, I report average consumer surplus, producer surplus (measured by price minus marginal cost,
or gross profit), and the impact of remanufacturer operations on both.
In each month of the data, I calculate industry-level consumer surplus from ink purchases by
willingess to pay for each page of printing, minus price paid. To do so, I first calculate mean
per-consumer consumer surplus from OEM and R ink purchases among the consumers whose whole
printer base I am able to observe in the data - that is, those printers whose first sale takes place after
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the data begins.8 I aggregate to the industry level by assuming these observed bases are representative
of the industry-wide printer base a whole, and multiplying the mean consumer surplus per model by
the share of that model in the estimated consumer base, and then by the size of the industry-wide
printer base as a whole.9 I report the average (monthly) estimated consumer surplus from ink usage
in Table 2.5.
I also simulate ink prices in each month as if the remanufacturer were present for all inks, and as
if it were absent for all inks. In the observations where the remanufacturer does not appear in the
data, I cannot observe the associated µjt or marginal costs, so I do the price simulation integrated
over the µjt’s and marginal costs, as I did for building firm expectations about the remanufacturers.
The remanufacturer has two effects on consumer surplus. First, its presence puts downward
pressure on the OEM’s ink price, improving surplus indirectly for consumers who choose the OEM
ink, and second, it offers additional surplus to the consumers who prefer it to the OEM ink - a
“business-stealing” effect. I find that the first effect is bigger than the second - this is reasonable,
because the remanufactured ink typically has a smaller market share (on average, 19% where it is
active), and also because it is an inferior product, with lower willingness-to-pay per page.
To calculate OEM producer surplus, I calculate expected pages of ink sales for each printer
whose sale I observe in the sample, and multiply that by the gross margin (price minus marginal
cost). I then do the same adjustment as with consumer surplus to aggregate to the industry level.
Producer surplus is smaller than consumer surplus - this is sensible, because the first few pages of
printing have very high marginal utility for consumers, perhaps because they are used for school
projects or contracts that need signed hard copies.
I similarly compute the difference in producer surplus in the all-remanufacturer and no-remanufacturer
counterfactuals - I find that the difference would be a total loss of $53.2 in producer surplus from
the OEMs, again with the indirect effect dominating. The consumers who switch to R ink gain less
8This requires throwing out a considerable number of observations in the early months, and so I do not include
consumer surplus for the first 36 months of the sample in the calculations that follow
9Statista reports this quantity to be 102 millions units for consumer inkjets and laser printers in 2010
(https://www.statista.com/statistics/216691/installed-base-of-printers-in-the-us-by-type-of-printer/), and oth-
erwise shows very stable printer sales growth (https://www.statista.com/outlook/15030500/109/printers-
copiers/united-states). Darby and Pociak (2007) observe that the printer market has been fairly mature for
some time, so it is reasonable to expect that printer base grows at about the rate of growth of households in
the United States. Thus, I adjust this 102 million unit base by population growth for the years 2006 through
2016 to for the purpose of estimating printer base by year.
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surplus from doing so than the OEMs lose, because consumers get less utility from the R product,
but the difference is more than compensated by additional producer surplus to the remanufacturers -
this is in part due to their slightly lower marginal costs.
I also find gross losses (negative producer surplus) on printer sales of $89.3 million per month,
so total industry producer surplus is on average $78.7 million per month among OEMs.
Table 2.5: Observed and Counterfactual Surplus.
CS from Ink OEMs Remanufacturers
Observed 405 168 10.2
Counterfactual: No R 376 206 -
Counterfactual: All R 429 154 16.8
Difference 53.0 - 52.0 16.8
Price Pressure from R 40.7 -30.9 -
Business-Stealing by R 12.3 -21.1 16.8
Surplus reported in millions of dollars per month for ink purchases. In the “No R” counterfactual, there are no
remanufactured inks available, and in the “All R” counterfactual, there are remanufactured inks available for
every product. In both cases, equilibrium pricing and consumption decisions are recalculated using model
estimates of marginal cost and preference parameters.
Finally, I consider a counterfactual where the RRC chips are rendered ineffective - for example,
because a regulator orders the OEMs to disclose the information necessary to disable or replace them
without. Note that this does not mean remanufacturer entry is costless, only that it is as costly as if
there were no ink chips. For the purpose of isolating the effect of the RRC chips on entry, I hold
marginal costs fixed, rather than reducing them to non-RRC levels.
I simulate ink and printer prices in each month as if the order were issued in that month. The
printers that are affected by the order are only those that have the RRC chip implemented and do not
yet face a remanufacturer; these printers immediately face lower expected future ink sales, and so
their prices rise slightly (an average of $0.80). Effects among unimpacted printers (those with no
RRC chip or with a remanufacturer already present) are negligible, with almost no change in price or
market share.
I report results in Table 2.6. Even among impacted printers the effects are small: the difference in
likelihood of entry in a single period due to to the RRC chip is only a few percentage points. Overall,
however, if the cost of compliance is small (it may or may not be), there are hundreds of thousands
of dollars in efficiency gains per year - particularly under the assumption that a remanufacturer will
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eventually enter anyway, and so if it chooses to enter, it is simply timing the entry event earlier, rather
than incurring an entry cost it otherwise would not have.
However, there is a much stronger effect from the marginal costs associated with the RRC
measures. When I simulate prices as if all inks used the weak chips instead of the strong chips, I
find that prices drop considerable for both inks, and lead to $4.9 million of additional consumer
surplus beyond the expected surplus gain from the competition effects. Predictably, OEMs lose
surplus, while the remanufacturers gain. Total surplus gains are mostly captured by consumers, as is
reasonably expected in Bertrand competition games.
Table 2.6: RRC Counterfactuals
Effect among impacted printers (millions of dollars)
Change in Change in Change in Change in
Expected CS OEM Ink PS Reman. PS Total Surplus
Competition Effect 0.137 -0.061 0.029 0.109
Marginal Cost Effect 4.9 -2.3 1.1 3.7
Interaction Effect 0.003 -0.001 0.0001 0.002
Total Effect 5.04 -2.36 1.13 3.80
Competition effect, marginal cost effect, and interaction effects on surplus do to dropping all RRC to “weak”
levels. The interaction effect is the expected size of the marginal cost effect, among the markets where entry
happens with slightly higher likelihood after the RRC is dropped.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a structural model for consumer demand over the lifetime of a differentiated
durable good and complementary consumable, and a model for oligopoly competition among the
firms that serve those consumers. I empirically estimate the model with retail sales data, and perform
some price simulations to determine the impact of a suspected cost-raising characteristic in ink chips.
I show evidence that the ink chips significantly raise costs for the OEMs’ remanufacturing
rivals (and to a lesser extent, for the OEMs themselves), and that the welfare effects of doing so are
significant as well. The most important effects are those on the marginal cost of each cartridge, with
much more modest effects on the remanufacturers’ entry processes.
This work can give useful insight in further analysis of raising rivals costs through input
characteristics, and the effects of these techniques in markets where reuse, refurbishing, recycling,
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and third-party repair are important (or potentially important) sources of competition against OEMs.
These types of markets are of growing interest - in 20 U.S. states, legislatures are considering
some form of Right-to-Repair legislation, which would limit the ability of OEMs to employ such
techniques, or to withhold the tools or information to circumvent them.10
Omitted from this discussion are the possibly quite interesting issues of firm dynamics. The
presence of the remanufacturers is an absorbing state for each market, and so firms have incentives to
stop producing those printers - I find preliminary evidence that the OEMs do engage in some measure
of portfolio management with respect to their printer offerings. Over the course of the data sample,
there are many hundreds of printer models that are introduced and discontinued, and as discussed,
there is not much evidence of innovation in this market. Further, I find that for any two printers of
the same age (that is, printers that have been available on the market for the same number of months),
if one printer faces a remanufacturer for its inks, that printer is 28% more likely to be discontinued in
the following month than the printer that does not.
The setup of the model presented allows for straightforward adaptation into a dynamic setting -
even though the accumulation of printer bases over time affects firm value, it the case that Djt(ωt)
captures the full dynamic payoff of each printer sold, fully internalizing the future pricing games,
each of which are themselves actually independent of the built-up printer bases. Such a dynamic
game could also allow for identification of the fixed costs to the remanufacturers for entry, though
doing so would be greatly aided by a longer panel with more entry event observations.
10The Repair Association lobbies every three years on behalf of its constituent organizations (mostly third-party
repairers) to relax Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) protections for service manuals for electronics
and machinery products, reporting that “[T]oday’s equipment — packed with sensors and electronics — is
too complex to repair without them.” https://repair.org/copyright
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APPENDIX A: APPENDIX
Tables A1 and A2 describe product characteristics in the constructed dataset.
A1: Printer Characteristics
Characteric Description
Printer Technology Inkjet or laser. I drop all printers that use sublimation
Functions
There are 4 possible functions I observer in the data:
printing, scanning, copying, and faxing. If a printer is
capable of any functions besides printing, I describe
it as being scan-capable.
Footprint Width x depth, measured in square inches
Weight Measured in pounds
Color Whether a printer is capable or not of printing in color.
Print Resolution
A measure of printer quality. Measured in vertical and
horizontal dots per inch (DPI). 600x600 DPI is generally
the highest useful resolution for printing text in most
sizes and fonts. 4800x4800 is generally considered ”photo-
quality,” and excess resolution usually does not improve
images appreciably.
Print Speed
Measured in pages per minute (PPM). Most printers report
several speeds for different colors and different levels of
quality. I report B/W PPM as the fastest speed reported,
since this is typically used for text-only, and Color PPM
as the PPM for highest-quality color prints.
A2: Ink Characteristics
Characteristic Description
Ink Technology Inkjet or laser. I drop all inks that use sublimation
Color(s)
Ink color. Most cartridges have black, cyan, magenta,
yellow, or some combination of the four. Some photo-
quality inks use matte black, gray, blue, red, and green
in addition to the other colors to augment images. I
drop these inks.
Yield
Measured in pages. I adjust yield by color. For black
and tricolor (cyan, magenta, yellow) cartidges, I use
reported yield. For single-color inks (e.g. cyan only),
I use 13 reported yield. For cartridges and
combo packs that have all four colors, I use two times
reported yield.
OEM
An indicator. I use 1 if the cartridge is produced by the
OEM and 0 if not.
Figure A3 plots ink sales by brands for each month before and after the adjustments described in
the data subsection A. In the years 2014 and 2015, average monthly ink sales drop by a factor of
roughly two. There is still similar seasonality and noise in the sales data, and in 2016, sales return to




Researcher’s own analyses calculated (or derived) based in part on data from Nielsen Consumer
LLC and marketing databases provided through the NielsenIQ Datasets at the Kilts Center for
Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
The conclusions drawn from the NielsenIQ data are those of the researcher and do not reflect
the views of NielsenIQ. NielsenIQ is not responsible for, had no role in, and was not involved in
analyzing and preparing the results reported herein.
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